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How role assignment impacts decision-making in high-risk environments:  
evidence from eye-tracking in aviation 
Abstract 
 
Adequate monitoring of automated systems is an essential aspect of procedure compliance,  protective 
behaviour, and appropriate decisions in ultra-safe environments. In the air transport industry, the 
distribution of roles in a flight crew – Pilot Flying vs. Pilot Monitoring – reflects the importance of 
this task. Little is known about how pilot role assignment impacts monitoring behaviour and 
subsequent decision-making. We designed a field study where 62 airline pilots equipped with portable 
eye-trackers had to make a dynamic decision during approach in the airline’s full-flight simulator. At a 
behavioural level, pilot role assignment (Pilot Flying vs. Pilot Monitoring) influenced decision time 
irrespective of rank (Captain vs. First Officer), with later decisions for the Pilot Monitoring. Eye-
tracking results provided evidence that pilot role assignment rather than rank impacted fixations on 
choice-relevant information, with more fixations by the Pilot Monitoring. Overall, pilots’ fixations on 
choice-relevant information could predict decision-making. We discuss implications for the optimal 
combination of role assignment and hierarchical rank. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From nuclear power to medical surgery and aviation, operators have to make critical decisions in 
dynamic and uncertain environments (Dekker, 2003; Klein, 2008). In commercial aviation, for 
example, the pilot’s ability to make “good decisions” is considered as skill acquired through intensive 
training in a highly-procedural environment (Kaempf & Klein, 1994). Despite the existence of 
procedures and intensive repetition, local, adaptive judgment in particular situations is required 
(Dekker, 2003). An important element of every decision in standard decision-making models is that 
the decision-maker has access to decision-relevant cues – frequently described as representation of 
options (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008) or recognition of cues (Klein, 2008). Monitoring – 
defined as repeated assessment of the current status of the system – is vital for detecting, evaluating, 
and recognising unexpected changes in many domains with high safety standards from the nuclear 
industry to automobiles and air traffic control (Brookhuis, De Waard, & Fairclough, 2003; Metzger & 
Parasuraman, 2001). The definition of monitoring is linked to the first main component of situational 
awareness “the ability to notice changes” (Endsley, 1995). This ability is essential for appropriate 
decision-making. In aviation, “Monitoring Matters” is the statement of numerous aviation authorities, 
airlines, and aircraft manufacturers (CAA, 2013; Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). Poor monitoring has 
been identified as one of the major reasons of recent loss of control events (Dutch Safety Board, 2010; 
NTSB, 2013a, 2013b). Monitoring of cockpit instruments can be assessed by an individual’s visual 
attention distribution. For instance, cognitive psychologists have established a positive correlation 
between visual attention and decision-making (Deubel & Schneider, 1996).  Prior research has pointed 
out that the use of eye-tracking could give insights into operators’ scanning patterns (Duchowski, 
2002) – particularly in airline pilots (Dehais, Behrend, Peysakhovich, Causse, & Wickens, 2017; 
Sarter, Mumaw, & Wickens, 2007; Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Talleur, 2008). Schriver et al. 
(2008) showed expertise differences in pilots’ visual strategies during decision-making. Some studies 
interestingly pointed to the lack of compliance between operational procedures and pilots’ eye gaze 
(BEA, 2013; Björklund, Alfredson, & Dekker, 2006). More recently, Reynal, Rister, Scannella, 
Wickens, and Dehais (2017) demonstrated that pilots’ gaze pattern was indicative of their upcoming 
landing decision in a simulated scenario. 
Little research has focused on how pilot role assignment (who does what within a team) may influence 
cockpit behavior (Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, & Salas, 1999). In airlines, a two person crew is 
composed of a Captain, the higher-rank member holding the legal responsibility and decision power, 
and a First Officer, the lower-rank member occupying the right hand seat in the cockpit. Besides this 
formal hierarchical differentiation, pilots can occupy two different roles: Pilot Flying (in control of 
flying the airplane) or Pilot Monitoring (in control of monitoring the flight management, double 
checking Pilot Flying’s actions, and communication). Role change or task sharing is defined before the 
commencement of every leg of a trip (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). Whereas the Pilot Flying task 
is perceived as active, the Pilot Monitoring (historically called “Pilot Non-Flying”) is perceived as 
passive. However, the necessity of monitoring has reinforced the definition of pilots’ roles in the 
cockpit, emphasising the importance of an active Pilot Monitoring role regarding the detection of 
flight parameter deviations (CAA, 2013).   
Little is known, however, about how pilot role assignment influences pilot decision-making under 
uncertainty. In order to address this issue, we designed a flight scenario in a full-flight simulator in 
which crews equipped with portable eye-trackers had to make a landing decision based on ambigious 
wind information displayed on flight instruments in the cockpit. Pilots could make the decsion to 
either continue the approach and land the aircraft or to abort it (in aeranautical terms “perform a go-
around”). We chose the final approach phase since it has been identified as the most demanding (Lee 
& Liu, 2003) and hazardous (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2015) flight phase in which 
monitoring is an important element (BEA, 2013). At a behavioural level, one hypothesis – according 
to company procedures – could be that pilot role is not related to decision power and has no influence 
on decision-making. In addition, the decision to perform a go-around can be taken by both 
crewmembers in the participating airline. However, we consider that the detection of decision-relevant 
information on flight instruments is part of decision-making. Thus, at an eye-tracking level, one 
hypothesis – based on task sharing – might  be that the Pilot Flying is concentrated on flying the 
airplane while having less cognitive resources available for the detection of decision-relevant 
information than the Pilot Monitoring. Another hypothesis could be that both pilots monitor the flight 
parameters in the same way, double-checking each others’ activities. To the author’s knowledge, few 
studies have attempted to simultaneously measure both Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring’s eye 
movements in the cockpit (Björklund et al., 2006; Reynal et al., 2017; Dehais et al., 2017). Moreover, 
the researchers had access to a representative and relatively large number of commercial airline pilots.   
2. Materials and Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Overall, 62 airline pilots (age range 29-65 years, experience range 3,000-23,000 flight hours) from the 
same airline participated in the study. They were qualified on either Airbus A320 (short-haul flights) 
or A340 (long-haul flights). Table 1 presents the characteristics of this sample size. There were no 
significant age (t(60) = 0.25, p = 0.98), flight experience (t(60) = -0.48, p = 0.63), or rank differences 
(χ2 (1, 62) = 0.0, p = 1.0) between both groups: Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring. The rostering 
department of an airline randomly chose these pilots from the pilot pool. Random assignment is the 
normal process for creating pilots’ flight schedules. Next, we emailed these pilots, inviting them to 
participate in this study. Pilots were paid for their voluntary participation by their company. 
Confidentiality was guaranteed. All participants gave written informed consent. Crews were not 
familiar with each other. This reflects the most common situation in a major airline with a large 
number of pilots where it is rare that crews know each other.  
 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the sample size 
Participants (n) 
 
Gender, Male 
% (n) 
Age, years 
M (SD) 
Rank, Captain 
% (n) 
Flight experience, hours 
M (SD) 
All (62) 
Pilot Flying  (31) 
92 (57) 
90 (28) 
  46.2 (10.2) 
46.2 (7.9) 
52% (32) 
52% (16) 
11034 (4255) 
10771 (4441) 
Pilot Monitoring (31) 94 (29)   46.1 (12.3) 52% (16) 11297 (4118) 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
Prior to the empirical study in the company’s full-flight simulator, each participant signed a consent 
form and was briefed on the study’s aim: understanding pilots’ visual attention distribution during 
flight, without specifying fixations on wind information under conflict during final approach. As in 
regular simulator training, pilots are not informed in advance about the whole scenario and its purpose. 
We aimed to observe pilot behaviour in the most natural context. Next, the volunteer pilot was taken 
to the full-flight simultor where he/she took his habitual crew position in the cockpit (First Officer 
right seat, Captain left seat). The volunteer participant was equipped with a portable eye-tracker. A 
confederate pilot with the opposite rank joined the participant. In order to minimise individual 
differences in pair work, the confederate pilot was briefed to behave as neutrally as possible without 
being proactive in action taking. The approach scenario of 15 minutes started as soon as crew agreed 
and finished their approach briefing. The pilots performed further approaches which were not subject 
to the current research. Upon completion of the scenario, the experimenters accompanied the volunteer 
participant into a debriefing room where he/she gave demographic information and responded to 
questions regarding the flight scenario. In the end, we debriefed all participants on our interest in 
decision-making under uncertainty.  
Figure 1 illustrates the protocol timeline.  
 
Figure 1. Protocol timeline. 
 
2.3 Apparatus 
 
Flight simulator. To create a realistic environment, the study was conducted in the airline’s two 
Airbus-type full-flight simulators (FFS Level D): an A320-214 (CAE visual system and motion 
system) and an A340-300 device (CAE visual system and Thomson motion system).  
Eye-tracking system. Participants’ fixation patterns were recorded at 100 Hz using the Tobii Pro 
Glasses 2 wearable eye-trackers. Additionally, the head unit of the eye-trackers captured the 
participants’ visual scene in real time (camera) as well as verbal communications (microphone). Eye 
fixations were mapped on a reference image including the major flight instruments. One area of 
interest, i.e. the wind indication on the Navigation Display, was identified (see Figure 2). According to 
the Tobii Pro Lab Analysis Tool, we used the Tobii I-VT (Fixation) filter: the velocity calculator has a 
window length of 20ms, the threshold of the fixation classifier is 30 degrees/second and the minimum 
fixation duration is 60ms. The I-VT (Velocity-Threshold identification fixation filter) is based on the 
work by Komogortsev, Gobert, Jayarathna, Koh, and Gowda (2010) as well as Salvucci and Goldberg 
(2000). 
2.4 Scenario 
 
In collaboration with the participating airline, we designed a scenario which was programmed by a 
flight instructor. Each participant performed the same approach. The level of automation was left to 
the crew’s discretion. However, the flight crew had to disconnect the autopilot before 160ft above 
ground level, since the approach was an Instrumental Landing System (ILS) category (CAT) 1. During 
the approach, a computer voice provided live air traffic control communications of other airplanes 
landing on the same runway. 
 
Figure 2. An example of the reference image with the area of interest (wind). Analyses were focused on the decision relevant 
item in the cockpit.  
We aimed to create an uncertain decision situation by manipulating wind information in the cockpit. 
According to the Airbus Aircraft Flight Manual, both aircrafts (A320 and A340) were limited to 10 
knots tailwind at landing. The flight crew must respect this limitation. While Air Traffic Control 
indicated a tailwind within aircraft limitations, cockpit information (Navigation  Display) displayed a 
tailwind out of aircraft limitations. This is a frequent operational situation for pilots since wind 
information is elaborated differently: Air Traffic Control information is based on wind measurement 
on the ground (two minutes mean value). Aircraft displays a computed real-time wind at actual flight 
level. Air Traffic Control information is verbally communicated to crew, whereas the pilot has to 
detect or monitor the aircraft information.  
Participants (half PF, half PM) performed an approach at Munich Airport, starting at flight level 150. 
This airport was chosen due to the long runway length of 4000 meters. The weather was rainy and the 
runway wet. Air Traffic Control cleared the aircraft for the ILS CAT 1 approach runway 08L. The 
ceiling was at 500ft. At 700ft above ground level, the wind turned into an illegitimate tailwind (220/17 
knots) on aircraft displays, whereas wind information given by Air Traffic Control remained 
unchanged.  
  
 
Pilots are forced to make a decision since according to company procedures, they are allowed to 
continue the approach but also always might choose to perform a go-around. The scenario lasted 
around 15 minutes.  
 
2.5 Measures 
 
Pilot role. Pilots were divided into two groups: Pilot Flying versus Pilot Monitoring. In order to 
represent equally rank, half of the Pilot Flying were Captains, half of them First Officers (vice versa 
for Pilot Monitoring). See Table 1 for more details. 
Flight experience. Pilots indicated their flight experience in number of flight hours (see Table 1). 
Decision. Pilots responses (continue the approach or perform a go-around) were recorded by the 
experimenter who was present in each simulator scenario. According to role and company procedures, 
the Pilot Flying executes the go-around since he/she flies the airplane. When the Pilot Monitoring 
wishes to perform a go-around, he makes the call-out Go-around which the Pilot Flying has to follow 
and automatically executes. In this study, the call-out Go-around was counted as the decision to 
perform a go-around when the participating pilot was Pilot Monitoring. When the participating pilot 
was Pilot Flying, the go-around execution was counted as the decision to perform a go-around.   
Information acquisition / gaze data. The decision-relevant information in the cockpit is displayed on 
the navigation display: the wind (see Figure 2). We measured the number of eye fixations on the wind 
indication during final approach. For each participant, we analysed ocular behaviour for the following 
two phases: first between 1,000ft and 200ft (from stabilisation height to decision height) and second 
between 200ft and 100ft / decision (from decision height to go-around decision). The stabilisation 
height and the decision height are two important decision moments during approach. At the 
stabilisation height, the stabilisation criteria (technical values such as the correct speed, etc.) have to 
be met in order to continue the approach. Otherwise, a go-around has to be performed. The decision 
height is a specific altitude and decision moment where the pilot has to see the runway. If the required 
visual references are not acquired, a go-around should be performed according to procedures (see 
Figure 3 for illustration). 
 
2.6 Eye-tracking data quality and exclusion 
 
The pilots’ gaze data was verified in order to ensure data-availability quality criteria. Overall pupil 
detection quality was good (M = 87 %). We had to exclude five from the 62 participants for the eye-
tracking analyses due to recording issues during the simulator scenario.  
3 Results 
 
3.1 Behavioural results 
 
Overall, 47% of all pilots made the decision to perform a go-around. Among these pilots, almost all 
(95%) decided under 200ft Above Ground Level (AGL), i.e., approximately at 100ft (M reaction time 
after decision height = 8,32 sec, SD reaction time after decision height = 4,2 sec). During debriefing, 
most pilots reported that their aim was to delay the decision as long as possible in order to see if the 
wind on the navigation diplay would calm down close to ground. Figure 3 illustrates the scenario 
timeline with the pilots’ key decision moments (AGL) during approach.  
 
Figure 3. Scenario timeline with pilots’ key decision moments during approach. 
Chi-square test showed no differences between pilots’ roles (Pilot Flying vs. Pilot Monitoring) and 
decision (continue the approach vs. go-around); χ2 (1, n = 62) = 0.065, p = .79. Additionally, there 
were no significant decision differences between both Captains and First Officers operating as 
Pilot Flying (χ2 (1, n = 62) = 2.64, p = .10). However, Fisher’s Exact test found significant 
differences between the Captains and First Officers working as Pilot Monitoring (p = .011, two-
tailed), i.e., Captains as Pilot Monitoring asked more often for a go-around than First Officers as 
Pilot Monitoring (see Figure 4). Overall, chi-square test showed an effect of rank (Captain vs. 
First Officer) on decision-making (χ2 (1, n = 62) = 9.44, p = .002, φ = .39), i.e., Captains 
performed or asked more often for a go-
around than First Officers.  
 
  
 Figure 4. Pilot Flyings’ and Pilot Monitorings’ proportion of go-around decisions (%) as Captain and First Officer. 
Next, a t-test was conducted in order to understand the influence of pilots’ role on decision reaction 
time below the decision height (see Figure 5). The Pilot Flying made a decision earlier (M = 6.37 , SD 
= 3.98) than the Pilot Monitoring (M = 9.17, SD = 4.71); t(52)= -2.36, p = .022, d = - 0.65. Rank had 
no influence on the decision moment (t(52) = - .482, p < .631). 
 
Figure 5. Pilot Flyings’ and Pilot Monitorings’ proportion of reaction times after 200 ft (sec) as Captain and First Officer. 
 
3.2 Eye-tracking results 
 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between 
the proportion of decision-relevant wind fixations and pilots’ flight experience. The analysis disclosed 
a weak and negative correlation between the two variables, r = - 0.29, n = 57, p = .031. A scatterplot 
summarises these results (see Figure 6). An increased proportion of wind fixations was correlated with 
less flight experience. 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Simple scatter with fit line of the proportion of wind fixations (%) between 1000ft - decision and flight hours  
 
A 2x2 between-group analysis of covariance was conducted to assess the impact of pilot role on the 
proportion of decision-relevant wind information for go-around decisions between 1000ft and 200ft 
whilst controlling for flight experience. The independent variables were pilot role – Pilot Flying vs. 
Pilot Monitoring – and the decision – go-around or landing. The dependent variables was the 
proportion of wind fixations during 1000ft and 200ft. The covariate was flight hours. Levene’s test 
and normality checks were carried out and met. There were significant differences in proportion of 
wind fixations between role (F(1, 52) = 6.68, p = .013, ηp2 = .114) and decision (F(1, 52) = 4.12, p = 
.048, ηp2 = .073). Post hoc tests showed a tendency that go-around pilots fixed more often on the wind 
than landing pilots (p = .048). The group Pilot Monitoring fixed more often the wind than the group 
Pilot Flying (p = .013). The covariate, flight hours, was significantly related to the participants 
proportion of wind fixations, (F(1, 52) = 8.18, p = .006, ηp2 = .136). 
Next, we performed another 2x2 between-group analysis of covariance to test the impact of pilot role 
on the proportion of decision-relevant information for go-around or landing decisions between 200ft 
and the go-around decision whilst controlling for flight hours. Levene’s test and normality checks 
were carried out and met. We confirmed significant differences in proportion of wind fixations 
between role (F(1, 52) = 27.13, p = .000, ηp2 = .343) and decision (F(1, 52) = 4.09, p = .048, ηp2 = 
.073). However, flight hours were not significantly related to the participants’ proportion of wind 
fixations (F(1, 52) = 3.15, p = .082, ηp2 = .057). Pairwise comparisons showed a tendency that go-
around pilots fixed more often on the wind than landing pilots (p = .048). The group Pilot Monitoring 
fixed more often on the wind than the group Pilot Flying (p = .000). There was no interaction effect of 
pilot role and pilot decision (F(1, 52) = 0.10, p = .753, ηp2 = .002). Figure 7 shows both analyses of 
covariance between 1000ft and 200ft, and 200ft and the decision.  
 Figure 7. Pilot Flyings’ and Pilot Monitorings’ proportion of go-around decisions (%) as when performing a go-around or 
continuing the approach between 1000ft and 200ft on the left and between 200ft and the go-around decision on the right. 
 
Excluding the covariate flight hours from the 2x2 between-group analysis variance between 200ft and 
the decision moment, the main effect of decision disappeared (F(1, 53) = 2.17, p = .147, ηp2 = .039), 
whereas the influence of role persisted (F(1, 53) = 25.58, p = .000, ηp2 = .326). Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed that the Pilot Monitoring fixed more on the wind (M = 22.95, SD = 2.45) than the Pilot 
Flying (M = 5.89, SD = 2.30), p = .000.  
 
4 Discussion 
 
4.1 General discussion 
 
This research experimentally tested the influence of pilot role assignment – Pilot Flying versus Pilot 
Monitoring – on decision making under uncertainty in a high-fidelity simulation with eye-tracking. 
Behavioural results showed that half of the pilots decided to continue the approach, whereas the other 
half decided to perform a go-around. Pilot role assignment irrespective of rank impacted the go-around 
decision moment: the Pilot Flying performed a go-around earlier than the Pilot Monitoring. Eye-
tracking results provided evidence that pilot role assignment rather than rank impacted fixations on the 
decision-relevant information, with more fixation by the Pilot Monitoring. Overall, go-around pilots – 
when integrating their flight experience – fixed more often on decision-relevant information than 
landing pilots. 
The fact that half of the pilots decided to continue the approach reflects and confirms the uncertain and 
binding decision character of this situation. Procedures – frequently defined operating rules – are 
developed in order to cope with complexity and unify behaviour in ultra-safe systems (Dahl, 2013; 
Dien, 2000) such as aviation (Goteman & Dekker, 2006). The majority of pilots made their go-around 
decision below 200 ft – a few seconds before touch down. Pilots argued during debriefing that they 
delayed their decision in order to reconcile wind information at actual flight level (Navigation 
Display) with wind information on the ground (Air Traffic Control). According to procedures, a go-
around decision could be explained by superior tailwind information on the Navigation Display which 
was out of limitations (human-machine interaction). By contrast, a landing decision could be 
explained by the Air Traffic Control’s wind information which was within aircraft limitations (human-
human interaction). During debriefing, pilots categorised themselves in three different decision 
strategy groups: trusting entirely Air Traffic Control (e.g., “The Air Traffic Control wind counts; it is 
the legal wind”), trusting entirely the Navigation Display (e.g., “I completely trust my airplane”), or 
trusting and integrating both information in order to make a decision (e.g., “I consider both wind 
information. When doubting I take the strongest wind for any decision”). Figure 8 displays the three 
different options.  
 
 
Figure 8. Pilots’ reported trust in Air Traffic Control, Navigation Display, or both Air Traffic Control and Navigation 
Display for decision making based on wind-relevant information. 
 
These findings support the idea of previous research and safety analyses: procedures are prone to 
interpretation (Decker, 2003; Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). Lee and See (2004) argue that trust – an 
expectation towards a particular outcome – influences and guides reliance on systems and operators in 
order to better understand human-machine interaction.  Dekker (2003) describes two models in order 
to better understand the trade-off between practice and theorectical guidelines in safety environments. 
Model 1 considers procedure application as best operation rule that ensures safety (e.g., stimulus - 
response). Model 2 defines procedure application as cognitive activity that requires judgment and 
adaptation to specific circumstances, in particular under uncertainty or novelty. While civil aviation is 
often cited as example for model 1 (Dekker 2003), our findings show practical examples of highly-
trained individuals operating as both rule followers (model 1) and/or cognitive decision-makers 
(model 2).  
Time pressure inhibites our reflective system rather than our reflexive system (Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005), i.e., under time pressure, it is easier to be a rule follower than a cognitive decision-
maker. During debriefing, pilots reported that communication between both crewmembers facilitated 
the decision-making process under time pressure. Since the final approach is a dynamic flight phase 
with high time pressure, pilots’ experienced an easier decision-making process, when both pilots 
agreed on a common decision strategy during the briefing. An example of a verbatim of a Pilot Flying: 
“We have tail wind.  In general, I use the Air Traffic Control wind. However, when you detect more 
than 13 knots tailwind on the Navigation Display, please let me know and we will perform a go-
around.” Sharing a common decision strategy between both pilots with in a clear briefing can help to 
take actions under time pressure.   
As hypothesised and according to company procedures, we found that pilot role assignment had no 
influence on decision power: overall, both roles made the same amount of go-around and landing 
decisions. However, we found one distinctive difference: Captains as Pilot Monitorings asked for 
more go-arounds than First Officers as Pilot Monitorings. Our results confirm previous research 
regarding crew ressource management (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999): a non-expert co-pilot is 
less inclined to question the Captain’s actions when the latter is in command (Jentsch et al., 1999). A 
possible explanation from general aviation might be that novices have less decision-making 
confidence than experts (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995).  
Nevertheless, pilot role assignment influenced decision time irrespective of rank: the Pilot Flying 
performed a go-around earlier than the Pilot Monitoring. Qualitative video analyses showed that most 
pilots serving as Pilot Monitoring communicated technical wind information (e.g., wind speed in 
numbers and directions) to the Pilot Flying before making the call-out Go-around. One could argue 
that the Pilot Monitoring (not in control) wanted the Pilot Flying (in control) to perform the 
subsequent actions. The common understanding of the Pilot Monitoring is to detect and announce 
flight parameter deviations to the Pilot Flying (CAA, 2013).  
Combining these behavioural results with our eye-tracking results, we found a predictive role of the 
Pilot Flying between 1,000ft and 200ft: the Pilot Monitoring spent nearly the same amount of time 
fixating on the wind regardless of the decision. However, the Pilot Flying spent approximately three 
times more on the Navigation Display if he/she decided to perform a go-around. Did the Pilot Flying 
prepare his/her go-around decision? One could argue that the Pilot Flying might have anticipated this 
decision while integrating the wind information. Interestingly, we observed the opposite between 200ft 
and the decision: a predictive role of the Pilot Monitoring was found. Here, the Pilot Flying spent 
almost the same amount of time fixating on the decision-relevant wind, whereas the Pilot Monitoring 
fixated most on the wind if he/she made the call-out Go-around. Indeed, the flight phase under 200ft is 
very dynamic. Many participants as Pilot Flying delegated the wind check to the Pilot Monitoring in 
order to concentrate on flying the aircraft (different cockpit instruments and outside world).  
Overall, we showed that the Pilot Monitoring fixated more on the decision-relevant information than 
the Pilot Flying regardless of his/her decision. People look at elements in order to acquire information. 
Prior research from cognitive psychology has shown that fixations are related to visual attention and 
cognitive processing (Carrasco, 2011; Yarbus, 1967). Due to this task sharing, one could argue that the 
Pilot Monitoring might have more cognitive ressources in order to acquire decision-relevant 
information. These results further suggest that the role of the Pilot Monitoring is essential for the 
communication of decision-relevant information (to the Pilot Flying) during final approach.  
In addition, go-around pilots fixated more often on the wind information than landing pilots when 
integrating their flight experience. This result is reflected in previous research: people have the 
tendency to allocate more visual attention to decision-relevant information before decision-making 
(Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). Indeed, one could imagine that go-around pilots spent more attention on 
wind information on the Navigation Display than landing pilots who followed verbal Air Traffic 
Control instructions. Interestingly, more experienced pilots spent less time on decision-relevant wind 
information than less experienced pilots. Besides, previous research emphasised that pilots’ expertise, 
measured by flight hours, can accelerate decision-making (Schriver et al., 2008) and is predictive of 
landing decision accuracy in general aviation (Causse, Dehais, Arexis, & Pastor, 2011). At a purely 
behavioural level, expertise reflects domain knowledge, which shapes, together with information 
acquisition, decision-making (Shanteau, 1992; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). For example, Bellenkes, 
Wickens, and Kramer (1997) argued that expert pilots are able to better direct their visual attention to 
flight-relevant information; it is possible that they might need less visual information in order to 
evaluate the situation.  
 
4.2 Limitations 
 
A first limitation of this study is that the Pilot Flying could choose to keep the autopilot until the 
decision height (200 ft). The level of automation is correlated with pilots’ monitoring strategies and 
cognitive resources (Casner, 2009). Flying the airplane by hand without the use of automation induces 
high workload (Casner & Schooler, 2015) and may impair overall monitoring capacities (Haslbeck & 
Hoermann, 2016). Consequently, this might have introduced differences in visual scanning between 
the pilots who manually flew the approach versus the pilots who used the autopilot as long as possible.  
Although previous research has shown a strong relation between gaze direction and attention, it is not 
total. Indeed, it is possible to “look at something without seeing it” when cognitive ressources are 
engaged by unrelated thoughts, communication within crew or with Air Traffic Control (Casner & 
Schooler, 2015; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, and Dismukes 
(2003) showed that rapid attentional shifts (or task interruptions) could cause prospective memory 
impairments such as forgetting to recall a planned intention. 
 
5 Conclusions and implications for flight safety 
 
The objective of this field study was to better understand the influence of pilot role assignment on 
decision-making under uncertainty in commercial aviation. The scenario confirmed that procedures 
were prone to interpretation. Our findings indicated that the role of the Pilot Monitoring had 
significant influences on the Captain’s vs. First Officers behaviour. Moreover, pilot role impacted the 
decision moment, with earlier decisions for the Pilot Flying. The eye-tracking results demonstrated 
that pilot role assignment influenced visual information acquisition: the Pilot Monitoring spent more 
time on decision-relevant information irrespective of the decision. When integrating pilots’ flight 
experience, the percentage of fixations on the decision-relevant information predicted overall pilot 
decision-making. While previous findings have indicated several factors biasing landing decision such 
as economic pressure (Causse, Dehais, Péran, Sabatini, & Pastor, 2013), time pressure (Bearman, 
Paletz, Orasanu, & Brooks, 2009), proximity to final destination (Rhoda & Pawlak, 1999), 
overconfidence (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014), or perseveration for going home (Dehais et al, 
2019), this study brings additional insights on landing decisions made under uncertainty in commercial 
aviation. In addition, it emphasises the utility of eye-tracking to better understanding pilots’ scanning 
patterns. The high number of participants in a full-flight simulator is a strength of this study. 
We suggest the following actions: 
 
• In situations, that are not completely covered by procedures, a clear briefing between both 
pilots should be performed under low time pressure before starting the approach. This briefing 
might highlight predictable binding situations that may occur under high time pressure. For 
these particular cases, both pilots should clearly define and share a common decision strategy 
to facilitate the decision-making process under high time pressure.  
 
• Training should emphasise the active role of the Pilot Monitoring (in particular for the First 
Officer) for decision-making.  
 
• Training should value the role of the Pilot Monitoring for the detection of decision-relevant 
information and so the importance of sharing this information with the Pilot Flying. 
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Legends 
 
Figure 1. Protocol timeline. 
Figure 2. An example of the reference image with the area of interest (wind). Analyses were focused on the decision relevant 
item in the cockpit.  
Figure 3. Scenario timeline with pilots’ key decision moments during approach. 
Figure 4. Pilot Flyings’ and Pilot Monitorings’ proportion of go-around decisions (%) as Captain and First Officer. 
Figure 5. Pilot Flyings’ and Pilot Monitorings’ proportion of reaction times after 200 ft (sec) as Captain and First Officer. 
Figure 6. Simple scatter with fit line of the proportion of wind fixations (%) between 1000ft - decision and flight hours 
Figure 7. Pilot Flyings’ and Pilot Monitorings’ proportion of go-around decisions (%) as when performing a go-around or 
continuing the approach between 1000ft and 200ft on the left and between 200ft and the go-around decision on the right. 
Figure 8. Pilots’ reported trust in Air Traffic Control, Navigation Display, or both Air Traffic Control and Navigation 
Display for decision making based on wind-relevant information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
